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Manhattan Court Rebuffs Ex-Partner Custody Claim
Trial judge won’t apply, extend scope of NY high court’s 2016 co-parenting precedent
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD

M

anhattan State Supreme Court Justice Frank P. Nervo
ruled on April 11
that the former same-sex partner of a woman who adopted a
child from Africa after the women’s relationship ended could
not maintain a lawsuit seeking
custody and visitation with the
child based on the relationship
she developed with the child after the adoption took place.
In one of the fi rst applications
of last August’s historic New York
Court of Appeals co-parent ruling in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth
A.C.C., Nervo found that plaintiff Kelly Gunn failed to show by
“clear and convincing evidence”
that she and her former partner,
Circe Hamilton, had agreed to
adopt and raise the child together. Such evidence would have
brought the case within the
conceptual sphere — if not the
precise holding — of the Brooke
S.B. precedent.
Gunn announced she will appeal the ruling to the Appellate
Division’s First Department in
Manhattan, and seek an extension of the 20-day stay Nervo
put on his ruling.
Nervo’s consideration of the
2016 precedent from the state’s
highest bench was complicated
by its limitations. Brooke S.B.
was a consolidation of two separate cases, both involving donor insemination where former
partners planned for and carried out their child’s birth as
part of their relationship, with
an explicit mutual agreement
they would both be parents. In
both cases, the couples lived
together with the child before
separating.
Gunn’s case posed different
facts.
In its Brooke S.B. ruling,
written by the late Judge Sheila Abdus-Salaam, the Court of
Appeals cautiously abandoned
its prior bright line test, under
which a biologically-unrelated
same-sex co-parent was treat-

14

ed as a legal stranger without
standing to seek custody or visitation. The 2016 ruling made a
specific exception for situations
where a parental relationship
was created by mutual consent
within the context of donor insemination.
“Because we necessarily decide these cases based on the
facts presented to us,” AbdusSalaam wrote in that case, “it
would be premature for us to
consider adopting a test for situations in which a couple did
not enter into a pre-conception
agreement. Accordingly, we do
not now decide whether, in a
case where a biological or adoptive parent consented to the
creation of a parent-like relationship between his or her
partner and child after conception, the partner can establish
standing to seek visitation and
custody.”
Gunn and Hamilton, who entered into a cohabitation agreement” in 2007, were together
until 2009. “It is undisputed
that during their relationship,
they entered into a plan to adopt
and raise a child together,”
Nervo wrote. “It is also undisputed that the parties’ relationship deteriorated over time and
they entered into a separation
agreement on May 28, 2010.”
About 10 months later, Hamilton learned that a child was
available for adoption in Ethiopia and took steps to complete
the adoption. Gunn claims
that despite their separation,
she facilitated the adoption
through a substantial monetary payment as part of their
separation agreement, which
made it possible for Hamilton
to “establish a home sufficient
to pass inspection by the adoption agency.”
Gunn also arranged a business trip so she could travel
with Hamilton and the child,
Abush, on the London-to-New
York part of Hamilton’s trip
home after getting custody of
the boy in Ethiopia. Gunn presented evidence of her continu-

ing relationship with Abush,
though she conceded “her involvement with the child was
limited
because
[Hamilton]
would disapprove.”
Hamilton argued that the
couple’s plan to adopt and raise
a child together “dissolved contemporaneously with the dissolution of the parties’ relationship.” Gunn’s involvement after
she adopted the child, Hamilton
asserted, was “only a supportive role as a close friend.” Gunn
was “merely a godmother,” not
a parent, said Hamilton, who
argued she did not “encourage,
facilitate, or condone a parental relationship” between Gunn
and the boy, who is now seven
years old.
In attempting to adapt the
Brooke S.B. ruling to the facts
in this case, Nervo interpreted
the earlier case to extend to an
adoption situation — but only
if the plaintiff could show, by
clear and convincing evidence,
that the parties planned to
adopt the child and raise it
together and carried out their
plan within the context of their
continuing relationship. He
found that the two women had
such a plan prior to their separation, but it did not continue
through the adoption process
and the raising of the child.
The timing of Gunn’s lawsuit
is interesting. Hamilton adopted Abush in 2011, but Gunn did
not file her lawsuit until September 1, 2016, two days after
the Court of Appeals decided
Brooke S.B. Prior to then, her
suit would have been blocked by
the earlier precedent the Court
of Appeals overruled, Alison D.
v. Virginia M. from 1991. In an
April 20 article, the New York
Times reported that Gunn went
to court “to prevent her former
partner… from moving to her
native London” with the child.
Her complaint first went before Justice Matthew F. Cooper,
who issued an interim order restraining Hamilton from relocating Abush to London while
the case was pending. The case

was then assigned to Nervo,
who held hearings sporadically from last September 8 until
February 16 of this year.
Nervo’s ruling this month
granted
Hamilton’s
motion
to dismiss the case, denied
Gunn’s motion, and vacated
Justice Cooper’s order restraining Hamilton’s travel to London
with Abush. However, recognizing that Gunn would likely appeal and could have grounds to
argue that last year’s Court of
Appeals’ precedent should be
given a broader reading, Nervo
stayed his order for 20 days.
A prompt appeal could extend
that stay while the case gets
appellate review.
In a lengthy summary of testimony from both women, Nervo
wrote, “Upon the presentation of
the evidence of both parties over
36 days of testimony, constituting a hearing transcript of 4,738
pages, 215 exhibits on behalf of
petitioner, and 126 exhibits on
behalf of respondent, the court
finds the petitioner has on numerous occasions stated that
she did not want to be a parent and gave no indication to either respondent or third parties
that she either wanted this role
or acted as a parent. Therefore,
she has failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence
that she has standing as a parent” in line with the Brooke S.B.
precedent.
The court never addressed
the best interest of the child,
usually a key finding in a custody dispute, because a plaintiff must first establish their
status as a parent or otherwise show some extraordinary
circumstances. Part of Gunn’s
argument on appeal will likely
be that Brooke S.B. implicitly
overruled the extraordinary
circumstances requirement in
cases involving same-sex partners who had jointly planned to
raise a child together — even
in cases not involving donor
insemination or a continuous
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relationship.
Reading
through
Nervo’s
summary of the evidence —
which is unlikely to be upset
on appeal, as appellate courts
generally refrain from secondguessing trial judges’ findings
of facts in custody and visitation cases — it seems he concluded that while Gunn has
formed a relationship with
Abush perhaps deeper than
a mere acquaintanceship or
what a babysitter might forge,
there was significant evidence
she had expressed reservations
during her relationship with
Hamilton about the adoption
plans and had never directly
communicated to her ex-partner after the adoption that she
desired to take on co-parenting
responsibilities.
Given the Court of Appeals’
emphasis last year that standing would arise from a mutual
agreement between the child’s
biological or adoptive parent
and her same-sex partner, the
lack of evidence of such an
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agreement at or after the time
of this adoption meant this
case could not be made to fit
precisely into the Brooke S.B.
precedent.
At the same time, since the
Court of Appeals specifically
stated last year it was not ruling on factual situations different from those in Brooke S.B.,
the Appellate Division could
take a different view.
The Court of Appeals clearly
rejected the bright line test of
the old Alison D. v. Virginia M.
case, but whether it will countenance a broader exception to
the standing rules it carved out
last year is uncertain.
Gunn’s
attorney,
Nancy
Chemtob, told the New York
Times, “I believe that this decision doesn’t follow Brooke.”
The Times reported that
“Bonnie Rabin, one of Ms. Hamilton’s law yers, said the ruling
should allay concerns that a
trusted caretaker could suddenly claim parental rights under the state’s expanded definition of parentage. ‘That would
be scary to parents,’ she said.”
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